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Abstract 
This study investigates the significance of the determinants of capital structure 
on a sample of Australian multinational corporations and Australian domestic 
corporations over the period 1992 to 2001.  The determinants of capital structure have 
captured academic thought for many decades, particularly since Modigliani and 
Miller (1958).  If optimal capital structures do exist and that these structures maximise 
firm value, obtaining an understanding of the determinants of capital structure is 
important in obtaining an understanding of the way firms maximise value. 
Multinational corporations control considerable assets and some multinationals 
control more assets than that which is controlled by some countries. Decisions about 
capital structure may have important implications in regards to shareholder wealth 
effects.  Therefore, obtaining an understanding of the determinants of capital structure 
and the differences between domestic and multinational capital structure is of interest 
to academics, politicians, shareholders and financiers 
The results show that the level of leverage does not differ significantly 
between multinational and domestic corporations. Using cross-sectional Tobit 
regression analysis the results show substantial variation in capital structure 
determinants between multinational and domestic corporations. For both types of 
organisations growth, profitability and size are significant determinants of leverage. 
For domestic corporations collateral value of assets is also a significant determinant of 
leverage. For multinationals, bankruptcy costs and the number of overseas 
subsidiaries is a significant determinant of leverage. Surprisingly, bankruptcy costs 
are not significant for domestic corporations. In relation to interaction effects, 
bankruptcy costs and profitability are significant in explaining multinational leverage 
relative to domestic leverage.  
When industry effects are considered the significance of the original 
determinants remained constant however, some industries became significant. The 
industry effect was not consistent across domestic and multinational corporations. 
In relation to time variation in leverage and the determinants of capital 
structure, both varied across domestic and multinationals over the sample period.  
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1. Introduction 
Despite the extensive research of over half a century, the knowledge of the 
determinants of capital structure for corporations remains a controversial issue in 
modern corporate finance.1  Since the seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958), 
a plethora of research has been undertaken especially investigating the determinants 
of capital structure on domestic corporations (DCs) in the US.   
Optimal capital structure may have important implication on firm valuation, 
capital budgeting decisions and long term corporate profits.  Very little research has 
been published on capital structure determinants for multinational corporations 
(MCs).  Some studies have been undertaken to investigate cross sectional differences 
in capital structure between US based DCs and MCs during 1990’s (Lee and Kwok, 
1988; Burgman, 1996; Homaifer et al., 1998; Chen et al., 1997), little research has 
been published on comparisons of the determinants of capital structure for DCs and 
MCs.  In addition, the increased importance of ‘globalised markets’ with global 
competition suggests that the determinants of MCs capital structure are becoming 
increasingly important, particularly if they differ from domestic corporations.  
This research draws upon existing theoretical determinants of capital structure 
and empirically tests the hypotheses across a sample of multinational and domestic 
corporations in Australia.  Although the sample is from Australia the results have 
important implications for multinational corporations based in other countries.   
The paper is divided into five sections.  The next section reviews previous 
studies of capital structure literature, develops hypotheses and defines the variables.  
                                                 
1 Throughout this thesis the terms company, firm and corporation are used interchangeably. 
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The third and fourth sections provide discussion of data collection and method.  
Section five discusses the results and section six summarises the key findings and 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Capital structure determinants: hypotheses and variables 
Theoretical studies based on international environmental factors predict that 
MCs will have lower debt ratios than DCs (Shapiro, 1996; Lee and Kwok, 1988; 
Burgman, 1996).  Two major determinants of a firm's capital structure include agency 
costs and bankruptcy costs. The higher these cost the lower the debt levels. The 
difference in capital structures between MCs and DCs depends upon the effect of 
multinationalisation on these two costs. MCs often possess monopolistic advantages 
that enable them to outperform local companies in host countries (Kim and Lyn 
1986), and these advantages are reflected by the value of future growth options of the 
company.  Therefore, MCs' agency costs of debt (according to Myers' (1977) under 
investment prediction) will be higher and the debt ratios of MCs will be lower.  
Additional monitoring costs, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), are higher for 
the MCs that operate in more complex political and institutional environments than 
DCs (Burgman, 1996) and this is expected to lower MCs debt levels.  Geographic 
dispersion of MCs also increases auditing costs substantially, which are expected to 
lower debt levels further.  
On the other hand, MCs are thought to have diversification advantages in 
reducing risk. Studies have shown that international operations result in reduced risk 
for MCs (Hughes et al., 1975; Rugman, 1976; Agmon and Lessard 1977; Cheng and 
Han 1993). As the degree of risk is a major determinant in the firm's financing 
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decision, international diversification may enhance debt capacity, and thereby raise 
the target debt ratio for MCs.  
The competition between theoretical predictions based on diversification 
benefits and those based on agency and bankruptcy costs has motivated a number of 
empirical investigations. Evidence regarding the direct effect of internationalisation 
activities on debt structure is scarce. The few studies which compare the difference in 
debt ratios between MCs and DCs, use a dichotomous classification and generally 
report that MCs have a lower debt level than DCs (Michel and Shaked 1986; Fatemi, 
1988; Homaifer et al., 1998 and Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003).  Whether this is the 
case for multinational corporations domiciled in Australia is an empirical question 
that leads to the first hypothesis (stated in null form):2 
 
H0 :   There is no significant difference between DCs and MCs leverage. 
 
The dependent variable, leverage (LTD) is defined as the ratio of the book value of 
long term debt to book value of long term debt and market value of equity (Burgman, 
1996; Chkir and Jean-Clause, 2001). 3,4   
 
(   )  
(          )
Long Term DebtLTD
Long Term Debt Market Value of Equity
= +  
 
                                                 
2 All hypotheses are stated in the null form. 
 
3 Market value of debt would be preferable since it is a more accurate measure of debt.  However, 
Bowman (1980) reported a large cross-sectional correlation between the market and the book value of 
the debt.   
 
4 Equity is defined as market value of equity (Number of common shares outstanding multiplied by the 
year end closing price).  Book value of debt is defined as the debt written in the financial report.  Many 
studies have used value of debt in measuring leverage (see Friend and Lang (1988); Titman and 
Wessels (1988)).  Bowman argues that even if the market value of debt is a more accurate measure of 
leverage, the use of book value of debt is not expected to distort leverage ratio.   
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Following the first hypothesis there are eleven hypotheses relating to capital structure 
determinants. Two further hypotheses relating to industry effects and time variation 
on capital structure are also considered. These are discussed below. 
 
Agency costs of debt 
Firms with higher agency costs of debt are expected to have lower debt levels 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980 and Titman, 1984). Agency costs of debt 
include monitoring and control costs and this can be proxied by a range of variables 
including free cash flow (Jensen, 1986).  A positive association between free cash 
flow and debt levels has been found by Agarwal and Jayaraman (1994), Jaggi and Gul 
(1999) and Filbeck and Gorman (2000). Agency costs can also be proxied by growth 
levels. Titman and Wessels (1988), Chung (1993), Barcklay et al. (1995) and Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) all find a negative relationship between growth and debt levels. 
In relation to DCs and MCs agency cost of MCs is expected to be higher than 
DCs.  As the operations of MCs are geographically dispersed, the difficulties in 
gathering and processing information make monitoring (auditing costs, language 
differences, varying legal and accounting systems) more costly and time consuming 
than the cost of monitoring DCs. Hence, it is expected that the inherent agency 
problems will be higher for MCs relative to DCs. Therefore, the agency cost 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H0: There is no significant relationship between agency costs and leverage 
for: 
• DCs  
• MCs  
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Three variables are used to capture different agency related issues. The first is as 
suggested by Titman and Wessels (1988) as cash and marketable securities over three 
years average of total assets: 
      
3     
Cash and Marketable SecuritiesAgency Costs
Years Average of Total Assets
=  
The second variable is free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). The measure of free cash flow 
used is that as defined by Lehn and Poulsen (1989) standardised by 10,000:5 
   FCFLP = EBIT + DEP + AMO - TAX - DIV - INT
10,000
 
where: 
EBIT = earnings before interest and tax and abnormal return 
DEP = depreciation expense 
AMO = amortization reported separately 
TAX  = total tax paid 
DIV = total dividends paid on ordinary and preference shares 
INT = net interest expense 
 
The final variable related to agency cost is growth.  The firm’s growth is calculated as 
the annual percentage change in total assets for last three years Jensen et al. (1992) 
and Mehran (1992).  The growth in assets is a direct measure of current investment 
and, if investment is persistent, it is also a proxy for expected investment (Fama and 
French, 1998). 
( )1   
 
t tt
t t
Total Assets Total AssetsTotal AssetsGROWTH
Total Assets Assets
−−∆= =  
 
Bankruptcy costs 
Firms with higher bankruptcy costs are expected to have lower debt levels (Kraus and 
Litzenberger, 1973). 
                                                 
5 The 10,000 standardisation was done to ensure consistency across the other variables. 
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In relation to the differences in bankruptcy costs between MCs and DCs, Reeb 
(1998) and Armstrong and Riddick (1998) argue that MCs are expected to have lower 
bankruptcy costs than DCs.  MCs have ability to diversify across less than perfectly 
correlated national economies and this should result in less volatility of earnings. This 
should lower the probability of bankruptcy and hence lower expected bankruptcy 
costs for MCs relative to DCs.  However, MCs have operations in multiple legal 
jurisdictions and that creditors in different countries have differential information and 
remedies.  Burgman (1996) argues that these jurisdictional and informational 
differences increase the costs associated with bankruptcy.  Therefore, it is not clear if 
MCs are expected to have higher or lower costs of bankruptcy relative to DCs. 
However, generally firms with higher expected bankruptcy costs are expected to have 
lower leverage.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H0 :   There is no significant relationship between bankruptcy cost and 
leverage for: 
• DCs  
• MCs  
 
To proxy bankruptcy costs, several researchers, including Lee and Kwok 
(1988), Chaplinsky (1984), and Bradley et al. (1984) use the standard deviation of the 
first difference in earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) scaled by the mean value 
of the firm's total assets.  However, due to potential contemporaneous correlation of 
total assets with other variables, the numerator is scaled by interest expense.6   
        ( )  
 
Standard Deviation of First Difference in EBITBankruptcy Costs BC
Interest Expenses
=  
 
 
                                                 
6 The standard deviation is estimated from four years of EBIT. 
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Non Debt Tax Shield 
Taxation and its relationship to capital structure is explicitly linked to the 
applicable tax regime.  Under the Australian imputation tax regime the tax 
deductibility of interest is not expected to induce a preference for debt as it does under 
a classical tax regime (Bishop et al., 2004). De Angelo and Masulis (1980) formalised 
a framework whereby tax deductions that are not associated with debt (NDTS) act as 
substitutes for interest deductions.  These non-debt tax shields compete with interest 
as a tax deduction. However, these non-debt tax shields are only going to compete for 
interest in a classical tax environment. Therefore, for Australian organisations facing 
an imputations tax system, interest will not provide the same tax benefit as under a 
classical tax system.  
In relation to MCs, they should be better equipped to arbitrage institutional 
restrictions than DCs for the purpose of reducing their tax liabilities, particularly for 
MCs that have subsidiaries in countries with a classical tax system. However, whether 
NDTS are a determinant of leverage for MCs is unknown.  The above arguments lead 
to the following hypothesis: 
H0 :  There is no significant relationship between non debt tax shield and 
leverage for:    
• DCs  
• MCs  
 
Following Bradley et al., (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988) and Barton et al., 
(1989), depreciation charges are used to indicate non-debt tax shields scaled with total 
assets:   
      ( )  Total Annual Depreciation ExpenseNon Debt Tax Shields NDTS
Total Assets
=  
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Profitability 
Myer’s (1984) pecking order theory of capital structure shows that if a firm is 
profitable then it is more likely that financing would be from internal sources rather 
than external sources.  The argument is based on costly external sources of capital.  
More profitable firms are expected to have higher internal finances and hence, will 
tend to hold less debt, since it is easier and more cost effective to finance internally. 
Thus, this would suggest that there is a negative relationship between profitability and 
debt. 
In relation to MCs and DCs, MCs have better opportunities than DCs to earn 
more profit mainly due to having access to more than one source of profit and better 
chances to have favourable business conditions in particular countries (Kogut, 1985 
and Barlett and Ghoshal, 1989).  Consequently, this would suggest that MCs are more 
profitable than DCs.  This results in the following hypothesis: 
H0: There is no significant relationship between profitability and leverage for: 
• DCs  
• MCs 
 
The variable chosen to measure profitability is the average net income to total 
sales for the previous three years (Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003): 
Profitability(PROF)  = 
3
 3
 
t
s t
Net Income
Total Sales= −
∑  
 
Size 
Larger firms often have greater public exposure relative to smaller firms.  This places 
greater demands on larger firms to provide more information for customers, suppliers, 
analysts and government bodies (Cooke, 1991).  Provision of information is also 
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made easier because these larger firms possess the necessary resources to furnish 
stakeholders with the relevant information and hence producing extra data at a 
competitive cost than smaller firms (Cooke, 1991).  In the presence of asymmetric 
information between smaller and larger firms, larger firms will be able to issue debt at 
more favourable rates relative to smaller firms.  In additions, larger firms may be able 
to reduce the transaction costs associated with debt issuance.  The reason being is that 
the transaction costs will be comparatively higher for smaller firms than for their 
larger peers (Smith, 1977).  Here the argument is that firm size can be viewed as a 
proxy for information asymmetries between the firm and the market.  So, a larger 
firm’s corporate information is more easily available to public than a smaller firm 
therefore cost of debt will be lower due to information asymmetries.  Therefore a 
positive relationship is expected between firm size and leverage. Many studies have 
found firm size as a determinant of leverage including Scott and Martin (1975), Ferri 
and Jones, 1979 and more recently Agrawal and Nagarajan (1990). 
In relation to MCs and DC, it is expected that MCs are larger in size than DCs.  
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H0 :   There is no significant relationship between size and leverage for:   
• DCs 
• MCs  
 
The natural logarithm of total assets are considered as a proxy for size: 
SIZE = (  )Ln Total Assets  
 
Collateral Value of Assets 
The tangibility of assets, or collateral value of assets held by a firm is a determinant of 
leverage (Rajan and Zingalis, 1995).  Firms with highly tangible assets or assets with 
high collateral value can often borrow on relatively more favourable terms than firms 
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with high intangible assets or assets without collateral value.  Firms with highly 
intangible assets have relatively lower borrowing costs since the assets offer better 
security for the debtholders (Graham, 2000).  This would suggest that there is a 
positive relationship between leverages and collateral value of assets. 
In relation to MCs and DCs, it is uncertain whether the level of collateral 
assets is higher or lower for MCs relative to DCs.  This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H0 :   There is no significant relationship between collateral value of 
assets and leverage for: 
• DCs  
• MCs  
 
The ratio of fixed assets to total assets is used as a measure of collateral value 
of assets (Chittenden et al., 1996 and Friend and Lang, 1988):  
    ( ) = Fixed AssetsCollateral Value of Assets CVA
Total Assets
 
 
 
Additional multinational corporate capital structure determinants 
Diversification 
It is often argued that the international diversification of earnings should 
enable MCs to sustain a higher level of debt than DCs, without increasing their 
default risk (Eiteman et al., 1998 and Shapiro, 1996).  However, while it is believed 
that there are several gains to be made by venturing into overseas markets, it can be 
argued that continued foreign expansion has increasing risks.  Erunza et al. (1999) 
finds that the incremental gains from international diversification beyond home-made 
diversification portfolios have diminished over time in a way consistent with changes 
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in investment barriers.  For example, continued expansion has to contend with the 
increasingly difficult prospect of managing a multicultural, multi-location workforce, 
serving distinctly different customer markets, and navigating through a maze of 
formidable constraints imposed by the number of locations where operations are 
established.  This will drive MCs to reduce leverage.  This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H0:  There is no significant relationship between the level of MCs 
diversification and leverage.  
Diversification is measured as the number of subsidiaries operating in 
overseas countries (Tallman and Li, 1996 and Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003): 
 Diversification (DIVER) = number of overseas subsidiaries 
 
Foreign Exchange Risk 
The more sensitive a firm’s cash flow and earning are to foreign exchange rate 
fluctuations, the lower the expected level of debt.  This is essentially due to the 
increases in expected costs of bankruptcy.  Choi (1989) analysed the relationship 
between foreign exchange risk and corporate financing decisions and reported that 
foreign exchange risk affects significantly a firm’s financing decisions for 
international investments. Therefore, it can be hypothesised that foreign exchange risk 
is likely to affect MCs leverage.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H0 :  There is no significant relationship between foreign exchange risk and 
MCs leverage. 
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Exchange rate movements affect both the cash flows of a firm’s operations 
and discount rate employed to value these cash flows (Bartov et al., 1996).7  Foreign 
production and sales are two important determinants of exchange rate exposure for 
any MC because exchange rate fluctuations directly impact the revenues and 
production costs of the firm through these two channels.  This study measures foreign 
exchange risk exposure as per Wright et al. (2002): 
 
     ( )  Total Foreign Subsidiaries SalesForeign Exchange Risk FX
Total Sales
=  
 
Political Risk 
Political risk (PR) is the chance that political events will have an adverse 
effect on the operations and economic well being of the firm.  The type of political 
risk could be country specific or firm/industry specific and could include 
expropriation of assets, trade controls, institutional ineffectiveness, threat of war, 
social unrest, disorderly transfers of power, political violence, international disputes, 
regime changes and regulatory restrictions (Jodice, 1985).  Essentially, political risks 
are the risks that wealth will be transferred from the stakeholders of the firm to 
external parties, such as host governments. MCs that face higher political risk are 
expected to have less leverage due to greater probability of wealth loss. This leads to 
the following hypothesis:   
H0 :   There is no significant relationship between political risk and MCs 
leverage. 
                                                 
7 Bartov et al. (1996) shows that there is an increase in the variability of equity returns following the 
period of increased exchange-rate variability.  The results suggest that the increase in exchange-rate 
fluctuations is an indication of an increase in the riskiness of the MCs cash flows. 
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Political risk is measured as follows. Let C be the sample of companies and R 
the set of different countries that companies in the sample operate from. Let Ic,r be 
the revenue of company c coming from a particular country, r. The sum of revenues 
for company c, from different countries is the sum of Ic,i.   Pc,r is the proportion of 
revenue from a particular country relative to the total revenue of company c. 
Notationally this is as follows: 
∑
∈
=
Ri
ic
rc
rc I
I
P
,
,
,
 
 
For each country in which a company operates a political risk rating is 
obtained from Handbook of Country and Political Risk Analysis (Llewellyn, 2001). 
This is denoted as lambda (λi).  The political risk rating is then multiplied by the 
proportion of revenue from that particular country relative to the total revenue of the 
company. This provides a measure of political risk faced by the MC.  Notationally 
this is as follows: 
,
,
,
 ( )=
i c i
i R
c i c i
i R c i
i R
I
Political Risk PR P
I
∈
∈
∈
λ
γ = λ =
∑∑ ∑  
The maximum value of the political risk rating variable is 100. This indicates a 
low risk.  A minimum value of zero indicates the riskiest political risk rating. 
   
 
Other factors influencing capital structure determinants 
Industry 
Myers (1984) suggests that since asset risk, asset type, and requirements for 
external funds vary by industry, debt ratios are also expected to vary from industry to 
industry (Harris and Raviv, 1991 and Michaelas et al., 1999).  It is known that some 
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industries are characterised by high leverage (for instance, capital-intensive 
manufacturing firms, utilities) while others are known to have low leverage (for 
instance, hi-tech companies, mining companies).  However, there is considerable 
disagreement concerning the strength of the industry effect on capital structures.  The 
influence of industry on leverage should be independent of multinationality or 
domesticity of the firm.  However, whether MCs and DCs are influenced in their 
capital structure by the type of industry they operate is an empirical question. This 
leads to the following hypothesis:  
H20 :   There is no significant industry effect on leverage for: 
• DCs 
• MCs 
To control for industry specific effects on firms’ capital structure choice, a 
zero-one dummy is employed.  To be consistent in industry effect on capital structure 
across DCs and MCs, the Dow Jones Global Indexes (DJGI) - industry classification 
is used to separate ten industry groups. DJGI classification contains ten main type of 
industries. This is a sufficient classification without creating insufficient sample sizes 
that accompany finer categorisations.   The industry categories are:8 
BSC= Basic materials; CYC= Consumer cyclical; NCY=Consumer non-
cyclical; ENE=Energy; HCR=Healthcare; IDU=Industrial; TEC= 
Information technology; TLS= Telecommunications and UTI=Utilities. 
 
Time variation 
 Capital structure does not stay constant over time (Bevan and Danbolt, 2002).  
However, it is uncertain if Australian MCs or DCs have time variant leverage levels. 
Therefore, to test the time variation of leverage the following hypothesis is proposed: 
                                                 
8 Financial industry is excluded. 
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H0:  Leverage does not vary over time for:  
• DCs  
• MCs  
To measure time variation zero-one dummy variables identify individual years. 
 
3. Data  
All firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange for each year from 1992 to 
2001 were initially selected.   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 outlines the process of sample selection.  Initially 4,251 firms were 
identified across the sample period (1,637+2,614).  For each firm the Osiris database 
was used to obtain annual balance sheet and income statement data.  For each year, if 
a firm reported business activity from other than Australian sources (that is, a non-
Australian geographical segment) it was coded as a multinational corporation (MC) 
otherwise it was coded as a domestic corporation (DC). There were 1,637 DCs and 
2,614 MCs selected across the 10 years.  For each year this represents approximately 
163 domestic corporations (1,637/10 years) and 261 multinational corporations 
(2,614/10 years).  
If business activity was reported in the balance sheet and income statement in 
a foreign currency then it was classified as a foreign multinational and excluded. This 
resulted in approximately 100 (973/10 years) corporations being excluded on average 
each year as being foreign multinationals. Foreign multinationals were excluded 
because capital structure determinants for foreign multinationals may be different than 
those of Australian domiciled multinationals.  
Firms in the financial industry have capital structures that are determined by 
levels of deposits and financial regulation.  Determinants of capital structure for these 
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firms are considerably different from other firms and as a result are also excluded.  
There were approximately 20 DCs and 35 MCs excluded on this criterion.  
Firms were also excluded if the Osiris database failed to provide sufficient 
information for estimating the necessary variables.  For example, a minimum of three 
years of data is necessary for estimating some variables. This resulted in 
approximately 66 DCs and 10 MCs being excluded.  The final sample resulted in 
selection of 968 DCs (approximately 97 domestic firms) and 1,221 MCs 
(approximately 122 Australian multinational firms). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 presents the number of DCs and MCs in each year for the samples.  
Table 2 shows that there has been a general increase in DCs per year in the sample up 
to 1998.9  This is also the case for MCs up to 1998 when the number of MCs in the 
sample began to fall.  It is unclear why the number of Australian DCs and MCs has 
fallen since 1998.  Overall, in the sample there are more MCs than DCs in any year.   
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 reports the sample distribution of each industry classification for MCs and 
DCs.  Table 3 shows an almost equal distribution of sample selection across industries 
between DCs and MCs.  For example, the proportion of DCs that are in basic material 
(BSC) and consumer cyclical (CYC) industries make up just over 50% of the DC 
sample. The proportion of MCs in these two industries makes up approximately 47% 
of MC sample.  
 
                                                 
9 The decrease in DCs in 2001 was due to the Osiris database not being updated at time of data 
collection. 
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 contains descriptive statistics of the variables in the sample.  It shows 
that on average the leverage (LTD) is relatively similar between DCs and MCs (0.367 
vs. 0.363).  Also, on average, MCs agency costs-level of cash (AG), bankruptcy costs 
(BC), collateral value of assets (CVA) are comparatively smaller than DCs (0.101 vs. 
0.131; 5.216 vs. 7.547 and 0.610 vs. 0.637).  Australian DCs also holds relatively 
larger free cash flows (FCFLP) than MCs (5.173 vs. 1.623).  Further, Australian MCs 
have higher growth (GROWTH) opportunities and are more profitable (PROF) and 
are also larger in size than Australian DCs counter parts (6.959 vs. 2.896; 0.748 vs. 
0.596 and 12.694 vs. 11.969).  The degree of international involvement of Australian 
MCs ranges from one overseas subsidiary to 220 overseas subsidiaries.  While a 
foreign exchange ratio (FX) of 1 indicates the extremity of exposure, the mean of 
0.634 indicates that Australian MCs have 63.4% of total sales from overseas sources. 
The average ratings of political risk (PR) faced by an Australian MCs is 80. This 
indicates that Australian MCs are facing relatively lower political risk, given 100 is 
the lowest and 0 is the highest. 
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4. Method 
A Tobit regression model is used to analyse the variables and explain capital 
structure determinants.  A Tobit model is appropriate due to the truncated leverage 
variable (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  This paper adopts three different models to 
investigate the DCs and MCs capital structure determinants. Model 1 is applicable to 
Australian DCs: 
LEVERAGE1 = α+β1AG+β2FCFLP+β3GROWTH+β4BC+β5NDTS+β6PROF+β7CVA… 
+ β8 SIZE+εi 
where: 
Variables are as defined previously. 
 
Model 2 is applicable to Australian MCs: 
LEVERAGE2 =α+β1AG+β2FCFLP+β3GROWTH+β4BC+β5NDTS+β6PROF+β7CVA… 
…+β8 SIZE++β9DIVER+β10FX+β11PR +εi 
where: 
Variables are as defined previously. 
 
Model 3 is applicable to the combined sample of DCs and MCs: 
LEVERAGE3 = α+β1AG+β2FCFLP+β3GROWTH+β4BC+β5NDTS+β6PROF+β7CVA… 
…+β8SIZE+β9DIVER+β10FX+β11PR+δ12(D*AG)+ δ13(D*FCFLP)... 
…+δ14(D*GROWTH)+ δ15(D*BC)+ δ16(D*NDTS)+ δ17(D*PROF)… 
…+δ18(D*CVA)+ δ19(D*SIZE)+εi 
where 
D = a dummy variable equal to unity if the firm is a MC and zero otherwise; and 
Other variables as defined previously.   
The purpose of the dummy variable is to test if whether being a MC has a 
different impact on leverage than being a DC for the eight common variables.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 provides a summary of the hypotheses and the expected sign for each 
of the three models for each variable. 
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5. Results 
A test of the difference in mean leverage for Australian DCs and MCs 
provides a t-statistic of 0.258 (prob-value= 0.796). This indicates that the mean 
leverage levels between Australian DCs and MCs is insignificantly different.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 6 presents the Tobit regression results for Models 1,2 and 3. The 
adjusted R2 for each model is approximately 18%, 21% and 17% respectively.  The 
adjusted R2 in Model 2 compares to Burgman (1996) who report an adjusted R2 of 
17.88% for a sample of US domiciled MCs.   
Agency costs (AG) carry an expected sign for DCs (Model 1) and MCs 
(Model 2).  However, statistically it is not significant. The insignificant coefficient on 
the interaction agency cost variable suggests that MCs agency costs relationship with 
leverage is no different from DCs.  This finding is inconsistent with Burgman (1996), 
however the analysis is different as Burgman only conducted univariate. Burgman 
finds agency costs higher and significant US MCs relative to US DCs.    
The sign on the free cash flow variable (FCFLP) is positive but not significant. 
This is inconsistent with Agarwal and Jayaraman (1994), Jaggi and Gul (1999) and 
Filbeck and Gorman (2000) since they report a significant positive free cash flow 
variable for US firms generally. However, these studies make no distinction between 
DCs and MCs. The interaction variable on FCFLP is also insignificant, indicating no 
difference between the effect of FCFLP and leverage between MCs and DCs. 
The negative significant of growth variable (GROWTH) for both DCs (z = -
4.377) and MCs (z = -13.248) indicates that growth is inversely related to leverage.  
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This is result is supported by Titman and Wessels (1988), Chung (1993), Barcklay et 
al. (1995) and Rajan and Zingalis (1995).  The results for the interaction variable 
show no support for MCs having significantly different growth opportunities 
relationship with debt level relative to DCs.  
The support of the bankruptcy cost hypothesis is found for MCs but not DCs.  
This is consistent with Burgman (1996).  For DCs (Model 1) the coefficient is 
insignificant, for MCs (Model 2) the coefficient is negative and significant (z = -
2.072). The interaction variable is significant. That is, the higher the bankruptcy costs 
the lower the leverage for MCs and there is a significant difference in the bankruptcy 
costs relationship with leverage between DCs and MCs.  This is consistent with 
Burgman (1996) for US DCs and MCs.  
The insignificant coefficient on the non-debt tax shield variable for DCs, MCs 
and the interaction variable fails to allow the rejection of the hypothesis that non-debt 
tax shields, such as depreciation have no significant impact on both DCs and MCs 
leverage.  
This result is consistent with the findings of Burgman (1996). Furthermore, no 
support is found to suggest that Australian MCs have a better ability to shelter their 
income from taxation.  
The pecking order theory of Myers (1977) predicts that leverage will be 
negatively related to profitability.  The results provide strong support for this theory 
with a negative and highly significant coefficient on the profitability variable (PROF) 
for DCs (z = -2.374) and MCs (z = -2.923).  This suggests that Australian DCs and 
MCs prefer to avoid costly external financing and will rather take the opportunity to 
use internal financing. Furthermore, the interaction variable is significantly negative 
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(z = -2.156) indicating that the relationship of MCs profitability with leverage is 
significantly lower relative to DCs. 
The significant positive coefficient on collateral value of assets variable 
(CVA) for DCs (z= 2.766) supports the hypothesis of DCs with high collateral value 
of assets having higher leverage. However, the results do not show similar support for 
this hypothesis for MCs.  Furthermore, no significant coefficient on the interaction 
variable indicates that MCs do not have significantly different relationship with 
collateral value of assets and leverage than DCs.   
Consistent with the size argument, the size variable in the regressions of DCs 
have highly significant positive coefficients for both DCs and MCs (z = 4.580 and z = 
1.773). This suggests that the greater the firm size the higher the leverage.  Further, it 
is also found that the size relationship with leverage for Australian MCs is not 
significantly different than DCs. 
  The diversification coefficient (DIVER) for MCs is negative and significant (z 
= -6.026) suggesting that greater levels of diversification the lower the leverage.  This 
result is consistent with prior empirical work (Lee and Kwok, 1988; Burgman, 1996; 
Homaifer et al., 1998).   
The insignificant foreign exchange risk coefficient (FX) indicates that 
Australian MCs are not prone to foreign exchange risk and therefore this is not a 
significant factor to explain MCs leverage. 
The insignificant political risk coefficient (PR) indicates that political risk for 
Australian MCs also does not explain leverage.  
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
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Table 7 presents the sensitivity analysis of DCs and MCs capital structure 
determinants after controlling for industry effects.  The aim of this regression is to 
identify any industry influence on capital structure.  The results show that the 
significance of each determinant that was found earlier (Table 6) is similar to the 
significance of determinants in Table 7 for both DCs (Model 1) and MCs (Model 2).  
This suggests that the initial findings are not biased by industry influence on capital 
structure determinants.  The significant industry coefficients for DCs (ie., I_BSC: z = 
-2.802, I_CYC: z = -2.252 and I_TLS = -2.064) indicates that the Australian DCs that 
belong to basic material, consumer cyclical and telecommunication industries have a 
significant negative relationship with long term leverage. This means that if the DC 
belongs to one of these industries they will have significant less leverage relative to 
other industries.  
Australian MCs that belong to basic material, energy and industrial industries 
have significant positive relationships with leverage (z = 2.199; z = 2.612 and z = 
1.733).  This means that MCs in these industries will have relatively higher leverage 
than MCs across industries.  The findings of significant industry relationships with 
leverage support the hypothesis that industries play a significant role on DCs and 
MCs capital structure determination.   
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Table 8 Panel A shows the effect of time on leverage for DCs and MCs across 
10 years. Table 8 presents a univariate regression that tests the overall time effect on 
leverage to investigate the hypothesis of whether time has any significant effect on 
leverage.  The result shows that over time DCs leverage decreases, however, 
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statistically it is not significant.  On the other hand, MCs leverage is statistically 
significant and negative (z = -3.272).  This suggests that overall, time have negative 
impact on MCs leverage, therefore, gradually MCs debt holding capacity will decline.  
These findings support the time effect hypothesis for MCs but not for DCs. A further 
analysis of individual year effects has also been investigated to identify whether time 
effect has any significant variation in capital structure determinants, which might 
cause to vary leverage over time.   
In order to investigate whether capital structure determinants are time 
sensitive, individual yearly regression are conducted.  This is presented in Table 8 – 
Panel B (DCs) and Panel C (MCs).  It shows that over time the significance of each of 
the explanatory variables varies across years.  For example, the bankruptcy cost (BC) 
is found to be significant for DCs in 1992 and 1994 and 2001 while it remained 
insignificant in the other years.  Similarly, the bankruptcy costs for MCs is found to 
be significant from 1992 to 1995 while the following years the impact of bankruptcy 
costs to explain MCs leverage was not significant.  In summary, Table 8 supports the 
hypothesis that capital structure and its determinants vary over time.   
 
6. Conclusion 
This study has considered the significance of the determinants of capital 
structure on a sample of Australian multinational corporations and Australian 
domestic corporations over the period 1992 to 2001. The results show that the level of 
leverage does not differ significantly between multinational and domestic 
corporations. Using cross-sectional Tobit regression analysis the results show 
considerable variation in capital structure determinants between multinational and 
domestic corporations. For both types of organisations growth, profitability and size 
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are significant determinants of leverage. For domestic corporations collateral value of 
assets is also a significant determinant of leverage. For multinationals bankruptcy 
costs and the number of overseas subsidiaries is a significant determinant of leverage. 
Surprisingly, bankruptcy costs are not significant for domestic corporations. In 
relation to interaction effects, bankruptcy costs and profitability are significant in 
explaining multinational leverage relative to domestic leverage.  
When industry effects were considered the significance of the original 
determinants remained constant however, some industries became significant. The 
industry effect was not consistent across domestic and multinational corporations. 
In relation to time variation in leverage and the determinants of capital 
structure, both varied across domestic and multinationals over the sample period.  
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Table 1 
Selection Procedure 
 
Table 1 presents the summary of total sample and data selection processes for Australian domestic 
corporations (DCs) and multinational corporations (MCs).  The first column of the table lists the detail 
description of the data selection process while the second and third columns contain the number of 
observations for DCs and MCs.    
 
 
Deleted Sample Description Number of Observations (DCs) Number of Observations (MCs) 
Initial Sample 1,637 2,614
a. Foreign multinationals 0 -973
b. Financial institutions -203 -352
c.  Insufficient data -466 -104
 
Final Sample 968 1,221
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Table 2 
The number of DCs and MCs per year in sample 
 
Table 2 provides detail of the number of DCs and MCs in the sample for each year from 1992 to 2001.  
 
 
Year DCs MCs
1992 61 70
1993 64 98
1994 74 109
1995 86 114
1996 104 123
1997 113 134
1998 134 155
1999 120 151
2000 123 140
2001 89 127
Total  968 1,221
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Table 3 
Sample Distribution by Dow Jones Global Index Industry Classification 
This table provides the Dow Jones Global Index for industry distribution of MCs and DCs including 
the proportion of the total sample. The acronyms for the different industries are:  
 
BSC= Basic Materials; 
CYC= Consumer – Cyclical; 
NCY= Consumer – Non Cyclical; 
ENE= Energy;  
HCR= Healthcare; 
IDU= Industrial;  
TEC= Information Technology;  
TLS= Telecommunications; and  
UTI= Utilities 
 
DJGI   
Industry  
Classification DCs % MCs % 
BSC  256 26 312 26
CYC  239 25 259 21
NCY  95 10 125 10
ENE  68 7 80 7
HCR  82 8 94 8
IDU  158 16 257 21
TEC  16 2 59 5
TLS  36 4 14 1
UTI  18 2 21 2
Total 968  1221  
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables over 10 years 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the sample variables for DCs and MCs.  All the financial information 
was obtained from the OSIRIS database for the period 1989 to 2001.  
The variables are: 
 
(   )  
(          )
Long Term DebtLTD
Long Term Debt Market Value of Equity
= +
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     (AG)  
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= ; 
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10,000
EBIT DEP AMO TAX DIV INT+ +  
where: 
EBIT = earnings before interest and tax and abnormal return 
DEP = depreciation expense 
AMO = amortization reported separately 
TAX  = total tax paid 
DIV = total dividends paid on ordinary and preference shares 
INT = net interest expense; 
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DCs MCs 
Variables Mean Median Stdev Max Min Mean Median Stdev Max Min 
LTD 0.367 0.212 0.383 1.000 0.000 0.363 0.219 0.368 1.000 0.000
AG 0.131 0.039 0.230 1.623 0.000 0.101 0.047 0.151 0.565 0.000
BC 7.547 4.042 10.852 13.010 0.879  5.216 3.001 12.383 19.021 0.262
FCFLP 0.012 0.052 0.323 5.173 -3.270 0.030 0.064 0.226 1.623 -2.945
GROWTH 2.896 0.071 2.780 19.134 -0.580 6.959 0.064 11.214 19.134 -0.656
NDTS 0.024 0.021 0.042 0.194 0.836 0.036 0.031 0.034 0.022 0.634
PROF 0.596 0.035 1.205 0.973 -3.247 0.748 0.035 1.013 0.622 -3.302
SIZE 11.969 11.002 1.897 17.439 5.680 12.694 12.678 1.893 18.258 7.208
CVA 0.637 0.664 0.246 1.000 0.000 0.610 0.630 0.195 0.991 0.105
DIVER      12.066 4.000 27.593 220.000 1.000
FX      0.634 0.524 0.293 1.000 0.012
PR      80.598 82.675 8.569 89.334 55.582
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Table 5 
Hypotheses and expected signs 
This table reports the variables and expected signs of the hypotheses. The variables are: 
(   )  
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10,000
EBIT DEP AMO TAX DIV INT+ +  
where: 
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DEP = depreciation expense 
AMO = amortization reported separately 
TAX  = total tax paid 
DIV = total dividends paid on ordinary and preference shares 
INT = net interest expense; 
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Hypothesised sign Variable 
DC MC Interaction variables 
AG Negative Negative Negative 
FCFLP Positive Positive Positive 
GROWTH Negative Negative Negative 
BC Negative Negative Negative 
NDTS Uncertain Negative Negative 
PROF Negative Negative Negative 
SIZE Positive Positive Positive 
CVA Positive Positive Positive 
DIVER n.a. Uncertain Uncertain 
FX n.a. Uncertain Uncertain 
PR n.a. Uncertain Uncertain 
D*AG   Negative 
D*BC   Uncertain 
D*CVA   Uncertain 
D*FCFLP   Positive 
D*GROWTH   Negative 
D*NDTS   Negative 
D*PROF   Negative 
D*SIZE   Positive 
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Table 6 
Multivariate Tobit Regression for DCs and MCs Capital Structure Determinants 
A Tobit model is used to obtain the parameters and z-statistics accordingly for the sample of 968 DCs and 1,221 
MCs.  The adjusted R - squared indicates the model’s goodness of fit.  The interaction dummy variable is used to 
find the significant difference of the common eight variables.  For example, D*AG takes the actual value of MCs 
while it is 0 for the DCs.  The other variables are: 
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 DCs-Model 1 MCs-Model 2 Interation-Model 3 
 Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat 
C -0.166 -1.797 0.175 1.506 -0.039 -0.547 
AG -0.004 -0.043 -0.121 -1.359 -0.036 -0.459 
BC 0.000 0.290 -0.000 -2.072b 0.000 0.260 
FCFLP 0.034 1.066 0.049 0.958 0.045 1.400 
GROWTH -0.000 -4.377a -0.000 -13.248a -0.000 -4.259a 
NDTS 0.220 0.532 0.275 0.809 -0.194 -0.467 
PROF -0.001 -2.374b -0.002 -2.923a -0.000 -17.861a 
CVA 0.182 2.766a 0.086 1.312 0.146 2.264b 
SIZE 0.033 4.580a 0.012 1.773c 0.025 4.058a 
DIVER   -0.002 -6.026a -0.002 -2.177b 
FX   -0.035 -0.810 -0.014 -0.334 
PR   0.001 0.476 -0.002 -6.204a 
D*AG     -0.061 -0.538 
D*FCFLP     -0.002 -0.030 
D*GROWTH     -0.000 -0.971 
D*BC     -0.000 -3.522a 
D*NDTS     0.407 0.773 
D*PROF     -0.001 -2.156b 
D*CVA     -0.041 -0.458 
D*SIZE     -0.007 -0.939 
Adj R2 0.181  0.214  0.166  
No. of Obs 968  1221  2829  
 
a: Significant at the 1% level (two tailed test) 
b: Significant at the 5% level (two tailed test) 
c: Significant at the 10% level (two tailed test) 
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Table 7 
The Sensitivity Analysis of DCs and MCs Capital Structure Determinants after 
controlling for Industry 
This table represents the sensitivity of Industry level leverage for both MCs and DCs.  The acronyms for the 
industries are: The table provides the Dow Jones Global Index for five countries industry distribution of MCs and 
DCs including the proportion of the total sample. The acronyms for the industries are: Basic Materials (BSC), 
Consumer – Cyclical (CYC), Energy (ENE), Consumer Healthcare (HCR), Industrial (IDU), Consumer - Non 
Cyclical (NCY), Technology (TEC), Telecommunications (TLS), Utilities (UTI). 
 
DCs- Model 1  MCs-Model 2 
 Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat 
AG 0.056 0.644 -0.151 -1.611 
BC 0.000 0.248 0.000 -2.078b 
FCFLP 0.041 1.288 0.039 0.697 
GROWTH 0.000 -3.923a 0.000 -4.720a 
CVA 0.268 4.085a 0.007 0.095 
SIZE 0.029 3.688a 0.014 2.203b 
NDTS -0.057 -0.155 0.367 1.052 
PROF 0.000 -15.744a 0.002 -2.540b 
DIVER   -0.001 -5.331a 
FX   0.363 0.021 
PR   0.001 0.031 
I_BSC -0.270 -2.802a 0.265 2.199b 
I_CYC -0.237 -2.252b 0.182 1.538 
I_ENE -0.155 -1.229 0.348 2.612a 
I_HCR -0.214 -1.831 0.206 1.625 
I_IDU -0.038 -0.378 0.209 1.733c 
I_NCY -0.131 -1.265 0.156 1.333 
I_TEC 0.115 0.725 0.158 1.199 
I_TLS -0.271 -2.064b 0.218 1.318 
I_UTI 0.184 1.378 0.079 0.651 
     
No. Obs 968  1221  
 
a: Significant at the 1% level (two tailed test) 
b: Significant at the 5% level (two tailed test) 
c: Significant at the 10% level (two tailed test) 
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Table 8 
Time Variation on Capital Structure 
 
Panel A: This panel shows the effect of time on leverage. 
 
  
 DCs MCs 
 Coeff z-stat Coeff z-stat 
Constant 0.385 11.613a 0.434 16.317a 
Year -0.006 -1.221 -0.013 -3.272a 
     
Adj R2  0.005  0.001  
Observations 968  1221  
 
a: Significant at the 1% level (two tailed test) 
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Panel B: Cross Sectional Time Series Analysis for DCs over 10 Years. 
 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  
Variable Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat 
C -0.202 -0.690 -0.309 -0.965 0.031 0.116 0.175 0.621 0.015 0.058 -0.435 -1.428 -0.264 -0.864 -0.088 -0.270 -0.246 -0.840 0.007 0.020 
AG -0.008 -0.028 -0.004 -0.012 0.353 1.240 -0.071 -0.215 0.340 1.310 0.227 0.963 0.008 0.026 -0.227 -0.692 -0.376 -2.816a -0.220 -1.393 
BC -0.000 -2.455b -0.000 -0.505 -0.000 -1.847c -0.000 -1.160 -0.000 -0.270 -0.000 -0.746 -0.000 -0.711 -0.000 -1.331 -0.000 -0.583 -0.000 -4.622a 
CVA 0.397 1.574 0.340 1.348 0.106 0.454 0.081 0.371 0.206 1.019 0.287 1.322 0.120 0.677 0.124 0.595 0.051 0.262 0.172 0.847 
FCFLP 0.121 0.638 -0.940 -1.661 0.034 0.919 -0.058 -0.455 1.571 3.080a 0.365 1.918 -0.090 -0.842 -0.109 -0.426 -0.238 -1.167 -0.015 -0.172 
GROWTH 0.000 -2.583a 0.000 -3.432a -0.008 -1.552 0.005 1.128 -0.094 -1.097 -0.047 -0.956 0.050 0.838 -0.081 -2.101b -0.058 -6.185a -0.085 -1.014 
NDTS 2.749 1.700 0.419 0.132 2.212 1.020 2.657 1.453 4.530 2.129b 2.300 1.566 -0.533 -1.120 0.454 0.451 0.614 0.601 -0.872 -0.764 
PROF 0.001 0.782 0.002 2.211b 0.000 0.598 -0.000 -5.234a -0.000 -7.869a -0.000 -6.554c 0.004 2.313b 0.003 1.827 0.002 1.514 -0.001 -1.122 
SIZE 0.035 1.450 0.042 1.526 0.027 1.101 0.020 0.895 0.022 0.954 0.053 2.274b 0.043 1.878 0.032 1.335 0.048 2.050b 0.020 1.997b 
Adj R Sqr -0.037  -0.076  -0.061  -0.043  0.033  0.048  0.022  0.029  0.076  0.003  
No Obs 61  64  74  86  104  113  134  120  123  89  
 
a, b and c represents significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level (two tailed test) 
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Panel C: Cross Sectional Time Series Analysis for MCs over 10 Years. 
 
 
1992 1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  Variable
s Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat 
C 
0.605 1.574 0.795 1.328 0.394 1.169 0.391 0.647 -0.037 -0.108 0.930 1.565 -0.259 -0.615 0.884 1.464 -0.209 -0.780 -0.251 -1.005 
AG 
-0.006 -2.501b -0.708 -1.429 0.240 0.579 0.727 1.824 -0.075 -0.217 -0.038 -0.091 -0.206 -0.322 0.055 0.327 -0.150 -0.576 0.145 0.554 
BC 
-0.000 -3.168a -0.000 -2.514b -0.000 -3.046a -0.000 -3.475a -0.000 -0.643 -0.000 -1.336 -0.000 -0.671 -0.000 -0.196 -0.000 -0.178 -0.000 -1.604 
CVA 
-0.393 -1.105 -0.042 -0.179 -0.217 -0.876 0.061 0.310 0.120 0.543 -0.097 -0.501 0.127 0.805 0.235 1.169 0.232 1.327 0.384 2.547b 
FCFLP 
-0.898 -1.729 -0.322 -0.769 0.067 0.690 -0.155 -0.404 -0.398 -1.520 0.192 1.976b 0.097 -1.354 0.108 0.516 0.040 0.236 0.069 0.513 
GROWTH 
-0.022 -0.152 -0.000 -5.623a -0.070 -0.507 -0.080 -0.618 0.175 1.108 -0.038 -1.366 -0.058 -1.390 -0.014 -0.661 -0.000 -0.006 -0.035 -0.633 
NDTS 
-0.932 -0.444 1.584 0.771 0.722 0.376 -0.802 -0.487 0.225 0.120 0.537 0.314 1.760 2.587a 0.002 0.004 0.595 0.702 -0.473 -0.903 
PROF 
-0.007 -3.292a 0.001 0.724 -0.004 -2.260a -0.022 -3.464a 0.015 1.596 -0.002 -2.252a 0.003 0.276 0.003 1.504 0.003 0.554 0.004 1.633 
SIZE 
0.021 0.804 0.010 0.477 -0.001 -0.030 0.019 0.906 0.032 1.494 0.029 1.384 0.005 3.163a -0.001 -0.058 0.004 0.199 -0.002 -0.146 
DIVER 
-0.001 -0.329 -0.003 -0.548 0.003 1.204 -0.003 -0.512 -0.000 -0.137 -0.010 -1.692 0.008 0.879 -0.007 -1.025 0.004 2.158b 0.003 1.729c 
FX 
-0.025 -0.139 -0.253 -1.840 -0.030 -0.171 -0.098 -0.646 -0.051 -0.374 -0.113 -0.831 -0.104 -1.326 -0.150 -1.108 0.111 0.894 0.085 0.720 
PR 
-0.002 -2.239b -0.002 -2.996a -0.002 -3.196a -0.003 -3.571a -0.003 -3.556 -0.002 -2.174b -0.001 0.231 -0.001 -1.144 0.020 0.033 0.022 0.784 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.039 -0.012  -0.009 0.007 -0.032 -0.019 -0.013 -0.036 -0.039 -0.030  
     Total obs 
70 98  109 114 123 134 155 145 140 127  
 
a, b and c represents significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level (two tailed test
 
